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I. INTRODUCTION
All too often the statement is made and accepted that one cannot
legally make an enforceable gift promise. In other words, it is stated
and accepted that an individual cannot bind one’s future self to make
a donative transfer that will be enforced by the court should the future
self opt not to honor the previously promised gift transaction. How-
ever, not all agree that this is an acceptable state of affairs. A case in
point: the great contracts scholar Williston once wrote that the ability
to make an enforceable donative promise “is something that a person
ought to be able . . . if he wishes to do it . . . create a legal obligation to
make a gift. Why not? . . . I don’t see why a man should not be able to
make himself liable if he wishes to do so.”1
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* James C. Slaughter Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law
School. I thank my Research Assistant, Armina Manning, for an excellent job
editing and reviewing the Article. All faults are my own.
1. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1979) (citing
Proceedings, 35 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING
56, 194 (1925)).
926
2020] IRREVOCABLE GIFT PROMISES 927
Of course, a thorough examination of the history of contract doc-
trine and transactions reveals that Williston’s statement is somewhat
inaccurate. This is because at common law, a donor could make such
an enforceable promise using a “sealed” agreement.2 Indeed, in a few
states that have adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, one can still use the seal to make and deliver an enforcea-
ble promise.3 However, in a majority of jurisdictions in which the use
of the seal is prohibited, it is often stated and accepted that a donor
cannot make an enforceable donative promise. Thus, as contract law
has evolved, one initially could make an enforceable donative promise
via a seal, but for reasons that are peripheral to the issues addressed
in this Article, eventually that avenue was blocked.
By and large, contract law does not currently provide a legal ave-
nue for enforcement of gratuitous promises that require future per-
formance. Indeed, contract law has largely become irrelevant when
analyzing the enforceability of donative promises because gifts and
the enforceability of donative promises are the province of the law of
property. In order to make a valid gift, property law requires the do-
nor to intend to make a gift, deliver the gift, and that the gift be ac-
cepted by the donee.4
Furthermore, it is hornbook law5 that a mere promise to make a
gift in the future without delivery made contemporaneously with or
shortly after the expression of intent to make the gift will not be en-
forced as a gift no matter how sincere the promise was when made.6
Thus, one can make an enforceable gift transfer if the donor and donee
meet the three requirements of intent, delivery, and acceptance.7
What apparently cannot be done is to enforce against the donor her
mere promise to make a gift in the future if the donor subsequently
2. See infra notes 20–21, 124–27, 121–22, 139–42, 154–64 and accompanying text.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 97 et. seq. (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The
state of Wisconsin has explicitly equated a sealed contract with a finding of con-
sideration, while other states (including Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, and West Virignia) afford sealed instruments longer statutes of
limitations for civil actions even though those same states have abolished the
evidentiary significance of the seal by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code.
4. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 114 (9th ed. 2018); for discussion of the
three requirements, see infra notes 6–7, 26–40, 146, 157–60 and accompanying
text.
5. Id. at 114; JOSEPH M PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 4.5 at 156
(6th ed. 2009).
6. See infra notes 6–7, 26–40, 146, 157–60 and accompanying text (discussing in
greater detail the requirements for a valid gift).
7. Gifts are categorized as enforceable because once the three requirements are met,
the gift cannot be reversed by unilateral action of the donor. Thus, if the gifted
property is physically taken by the original donor, the original donee, now owner,
can bring an action in replevin to force the transfer of the gifted item to the do-
nee-owner.
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changes her mind and opts not to make the gift transfer or delivery.
The donor cannot make a valid and enforceable contractual agreement
that binds herself alone to complete the donative transaction.8
Despite broad acceptance of the rules described above, the state-
ment that one cannot make an enforceable donative promise is incor-
rect as a legal conclusion. An examination of the law and legal
doctrine beyond the province of gift or the law of property demon-
strates that there do exist enforceable donative promises. In terms of
the donor’s intent (i.e., her desire to bind her future self to an act for
which there is no consideration or reciprocity), enforceable donative
promises are effectively indistinguishable from so-called unenforce-
able donative promises. These enforceable donative promises are not
denominated as gifts and, thus, when the issue of the enforceability of
so-called gift promises is addressed, they are often ignored.
It is quite common in other related areas of the law—particularly
contracts and trusts and estates law—for courts to enforce donative
promises lacking consideration. These enforceable donative promises,
however, are not analyzed per this requirement and are therefore be-
yond the imprimatur of contract. Hence, the presence or absence of
consideration is irrelevant. Indeed, it is possible to make inter vivos
gift promises and testamentary promises that are enforceable.9 One
interesting fact about these enforceable promises that create donative
transfers is that the person ultimately making the transfer is not the
donor, the person who makes an enforceable promise.10 Instead, the
8. In the lexicon of contracts, when there is no agreement with the donee that is
supported by the mystical glue of consideration, there is no enforceable contract,
but simply an unenforceable promise that lacks consideration. For a discussion of
the tautological nature of consideration, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Contracts and
the Requirement of Consideration: Positing a Unified Normative Theory of Con-
tracts, Inter Vivos and Testamentary Gift Transfers, 91 N.D. L. REV. 547 (2015).
9. In this sense the promises are not made after the donor dies (which is clearly
impossible) but the promise is performed after the donor’s death even though it
was made earlier when the donor was alive.
10. As detailed in Part II, the party making the actual transfer will either be a trus-
tee for trusts or an executor for valid wills. I should note at this point that should
the individual die without a will, she will be deemed to die intestate and the
applicable state’s probate code will determine who inherits the decedent’s prop-
erty based on their relationship with the decedent. In this situation where there
is no will, the decedent is not making any promises that will be enforced in the
future by the executor of the estate because she has not made a valid will. Hence,
individuals who die intestate will not be treated as having made an enforceable
donative promise. Instead, these individuals will be deemed to make a gift of
their estate to those individuals selected as a result of the state’s intestacy stat-
ute. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (amended 2010). In effect, by dying intes-
tate, the deceased has opted to “give” her property pursuant to a default rule that
is premised on distributing property to the decedent’s heirs according to what
most decedents would do with their property if given a choice. This is the proto-
typical majoritarian default rule. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
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person ultimately making the transfer is an agent of the donor usually
acting in a fiduciary capacity.11
To be clear, examining trusts and estates law, donors may use ir-
revocable inter vivos trusts to make donative promises that are en-
forceable against the donor during the donor’s life.12 Putative donors
can also make certain inter vivos gifts without complying with the req-
uisite formalities attendant to the creation of an irrevocable inter
vivos trust by intending to make a future gift but dying before being
able to act upon that intent. Under the contractual doctrine of reliance
or promissory estoppel, courts will indeed enforce certain uncompleted
gift promises against the putative donor (actually, the donor’s estate)
if the court finds reasonable and foreseeable reliance on the part of the
donee.13
Just as importantly, a donor can make donative promises that are
enforceable after the donor’s death by executing a valid and enforcea-
ble will.14 Upon execution of an enforceable will, the donor makes an
inter vivos promise regarding the disposition of assets following the
donor’s death. These promises will later be enforced by the courts
through an agent of the donor as long as the donor has not revoked her
will or revoked the gift before dying.15 These donative promises made
in a will are herein labeled transitive. This is because when the prom-
ise is made in a will, it is unenforceable because wills are not irrevoca-
ble.16 The promise may subsequently be revoked by the putative
donor. However, if unrevoked or unchanged at the putative donor’s
death, the unenforceable promise is now transformed (hence, the de-
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989).
11. If the putative donor is dead, an executor or administrator will be appointed to
distribute the decedent’s estate. See infra notes 16, 51–52 and accompanying
text. If, however, the property is placed in a trust, a trustee who owes fiduciary
duties to the beneficiaries will distribute the property pursuant to the terms of
the trust. See id.
12. These are designated herein as inter vivos promises resulting ultimately in inter
vivos transfers. For further discussion of irrevocable inter vivos trusts, see infra
notes 16, 99–107 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of this oft overlooked inter vivos conveyance that is en-
forced by the courts, see infra notes 18, 24, 110–123, 134 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 11; infra notes 16–17, 28, 89–91, 134 and accompanying text.
15. As I address in some detail in my article, Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Is It Time for
Irrevocable Wills?, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 393 (2016) [hereinafter Johnson, Is It
Time for Irrevocable Wills?], although the donor can make promises that are en-
forceable following the donor’s death, those promises become enforceable only if
the donor opts not to revoke, change, amend, or alter the promise made in the
validly executed will before the donor’s death. In other words, even though the
donor’s promises in the donor’s will are enforceable, they are currently not irrevo-
cable or unalterable.
16. Id.
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nomination transitive) into an enforceable promise against the donor’s
estate.
Once it is accepted that three types of donative promises—those
made in trust, those made in a valid will, and those that induce reli-
ance—are enforceable while others are not, the seminal question and
issue becomes: Why are these promises deemed enforceable and
others are not? What makes irrevocable inter vivos trust donative
promises—promises that induce reliance on the part of the donee—
and promises made in a will enforceable, while other simple or future
gift donative promises are not?
The primary purpose of this Article is answering that question.
Part II briefly details the state of the law as it pertains to the enforce-
ability of donative promises (i.e., gifts)—plowing ground that has been
well-furrowed by numerous prominent scholars. However, this Article
goes beyond describing and defining these pedestrian gift transactions
in Part II by expanding the definition of donative promises and dem-
onstrating that certain transactions made in irrevocable inter vivos
trusts, promises that induce reliance, and solemn promises made in a
will are also the product of donative promises, yet are enforced.
In Part II, this Article explains another puzzle regarding the line
that divides donative promises that are enforceable and those that are
not. The dispositive factor is the formalities attendant at the execution
of the promise. These formalities provide courts with sufficient evi-
dence to affirm and enforce the promise efficiently (i.e., at little or low
cost and with attendant low error costs). In effect, they serve the same
purpose and act as a substitute for the doctrine of consideration in
contract law.
The formalities associated with an irrevocable inter vivos trust and
a valid will are well documented and require little explanation. On the
contrary, the formalities associated with promises that induce reli-
ance and are enforced pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 9017 are somewhat opaque and require detailed explication in
Part II. Indeed, focusing on the formalities supplied by the putative
donee who relies on the donor promises, this Article provides a coher-
ent normative thesis for enforceable reliance promises that heretofore
has been lacking.
Part III parses the distinction between enforceable and unenforce-
able donative promises, including those premised on reliance, as a
product of the functional formalities associated with enforceable dona-
tive promises and the lack of same with unenforceable donative
promises. The conclusion is buttressed with a brief recitation of the
17. For a discussion of the doctrine of reliance and the use of promissory estoppel to
enforce promises made without consideration per the Restatement, see PERILLO,
supra note 5, at 218–36.
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use of the seal at common law and how it served as a functional for-
mality in the context of an irrevocable inter vivos trust or a will.
Part III then explores the distinction between donative promises to
prove that the different formalities required to validate the different
promises rationally reflect the different types of relationships that
produce donative versus bargained-for promises. Part III pays partic-
ular attention to promises that induce reliance and are therefore en-
forceable. The formalities supplied by reliance on the part of the donee
do not seem similar to the formalities supplied by inter vivos trusts
and wills, yet focusing on their functional purpose, these formalities
serve the same purpose of allowing courts to enforce promises with
remedial certainty (efficiently) and with low error costs (collectively,
low adjudicative costs).18
Part IV focuses on the remedy sought for breach of a promise and
calls for an expansion—or rather the resurrection—of use of the seal
to supply requisite formalities to bind a gratuitous promisor to com-
plete the promise they have made by making that promise enforcea-
ble.19 This is consistent with the current economic theory of contracts
that convincingly posits that promises should be enforceable when the
parties intend them to be enforceable.20 The seal allows courts to effi-
ciently and effectively determine when the donor intends to be bound
and, just as importantly, provides proof of what the promisor is bound
to do.
Given the formalities associated with the common law execution of
the seal, this Article proposes to expand upon these inter vivos gifts by
adding future gifts made pursuant to a seal. Consequently, when the
putative donor intends a gift and satisfies the requisite formalities of
sealing, the gift should be given effect. The seal, like the other irrevo-
cable and enforceable gifts, satisfies the requirements of functional
formality. Indeed, it is the epitome of functional formality that served
as green light to an enforceable agreement that predated the develop-
ment and use of the doctrine of consideration to demarcate an enforce-
able contract or agreement.
The use of a seal to validate a future gift of a present interest or a
future interest in a present asset will satisfy the channeling, ritualis-
tic, and evidentiary functions served by the requirements for a com-
pleted inter vivos gift and, relatedly, a testamentary gift via a
properly executed will. These three types of enforceable donative
18. To presage the thesis throughout, this Article contends that all the formalities
serve a functional purpose allowing the court to provide an effective remedy if the
promise is breached. See infra Parts III and IV.
19. Thereby validating Williston’s thesis that gift promises that are intended to be
enforceable should indeed be enforceable. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 8.
20. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 195 (Denise Clinton et
al. eds., 4th ed. 2004).
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promises—completed gifts, inter vivos gifts accomplished pursuant to
an irrevocable inter vivos trust, and testamentary promises in a valid
will—are widely accepted and noncontroversial.
Consequently, this Article concludes that donors should have five
vehicles by which they can complete donative transactions, three of
which result in the enforceability of mere donative promises: (1) If the
putative donor is interested in making an inter vivos transfer, the pu-
tative donor can validate the donative intent by making a delivery and
effectuating a completed gift. If, however, the donor chooses to make a
future gift, putative donors can use: (2) inter vivos irrevocable trusts;
(3) promises that are reasonably relied on; and (4) transitive promises
(designated as such because the donor can amend or revoke the prom-
ise) made in a validly executed and subsequently enforced will. In ad-
dition, putative donors or contracting parties should be able to make
enforceable promises pursuant to (5) a sealed agreement.
Thus, the concluding portion of Part IV builds upon the insights
gleaned in Part III to propose a fifth type of future non-testamentary
transfer via the use of a seal. This Article defends the expanded use of
a seal by the functional formalities it provides to the arbiter and the
safe harbor it provides to putative donors acting as the equivalent of
legal version of a simple inter vivos trust. The original functional pur-
pose of the seal informed both parties to the bilateral transaction that
they were entering into an enforceable agreement—more specifically,
an agreement enforceable by the state should one of the parties choose
not to honor the promise(s) embodied in the seal. This Article contends
that there is no viable reason not to employ the same functional for-
malities to validate a unilateral promise even if that promise is a mere
gift or donative promise.
Proving that the doctrine of consideration is largely tautological
and circular,21 expanding the use of the seal in contractual agree-
ments as well as donative transactions will provide contractual cer-
tainty to agreements when the parties both desire that it be
enforceable.22 In other words, the inherent tautological character of
consideration provides no certainty that a court will later determine
that there was valid consideration and enforce a disputed promise.
The court may, for whatever reason it deems acceptable, choose to find
or not find that there is consideration.
21. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see infra notes 34–35 and accompa-
nying text. But see Johnson, supra note 8, at 556–57 (discussing the normative
basis for consideration).
22. Both must assent to the transfer because, as with gifts, no transferee should be
forced to accept a transfer by a transferor in a non-bargained-for transaction. For
a discussion of the requirement of acceptance for donative transfers, see infra
notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
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By recognizing sealed promises as enforceable promises, parties
can guarantee that their promises will later be honored by a court.
Furthermore, once the seal is universally available and enforceable,
other benefits may flow therefrom. The so-called trichotomy of reli-
ance promises—implied good faith in business relationship, uncom-
pleted gift transfers, and public policy cases—can be reduced to the
sole category of public policy cases.23 Thus, if parties wish to make an
enforceable gift or enter into an enforceable promise before a final and
formal contract is executed, they may do so through the use of the seal
eliminating any reliance or reliance promises (pun intended). Moreo-
ver, the illusory and highly chimerical distinction between gifts and
contract transactions will dissipate.
II. GIFTS, TRUSTS AND WILLS: FORM OVER SUBSTANCE
Throughout my career as a legal academic I have predominantly
taught four courses on a recurring basis: Property; Modern Real Es-
tate; Trusts and Estates; and, for the last ten years, Contracts. Prop-
erty and Modern Real Estate are obviously related but the other two,
Trusts and Estates and Contracts, are not. As any student of law
would know, enforceable transactions or conveyances24 are treated
differently in different areas of law. More importantly, these convey-
ances have different requirements that must be met before the court
or arbiter will deem them valid and enforceable. To be clear yet con-
cise,25 enforceable contracts require consideration; enforceable gifts
require intent, delivery, and acceptance; and wills require compliance
with Wills Act formalities.26
23. I detail this characterization and typology of reliance promises that are enforced
by the courts, even though lacking in consideration, in light of the Restatement.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). As this Ar-
ticle discusses, one of the primary reasons that consideration can be viewed as
tautological and manipulable by the courts is the use and enforceability of reli-
ance promises per the Restatement—promises that lack any notion of
consideration.
24. This Article refers to a transfer of a legal entitlement or right from one party to
another party (one legal entity to another legal entity) as a transaction or convey-
ance instead of a contract, gift, will, etc. because imbuing the conveyance with
such a narrow and area-specific label (area-specific because contracts are associ-
ated with contract law, gifts are associated with property law and, of course, wills
are associated with trusts and estates or will law) has the effect of further solidi-
fying distinctions between the conveyances rather than focusing on the similari-
ties of the conveyances. Also, referring to the conveyances by their area-specific
denomination has the effect of reinforcing the silos that have arisen in the respec-
tive areas of law—silos that should be destabilized if not eradicated.
25. This Article discusses each of these in greater detail. For contracts, see infra
notes 116–23; gifts, infra notes 61–62; and wills infra notes 85–90 and accompa-
nying text.
26. The normal Wills Act formalities are that the will must be signed by the putative
testator and witnessed by a minimum of two attesting parties. These formalities
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Teaching courses in three disparate areas of law—property, con-
tracts, and trusts and estates—each with its own set of rules gov-
erning the validity of conveyances in that area, leads to the conclusion
that the law has developed in different areas or “silos.” Although the
reason for the development of these silos is largely historical and be-
yond the ken of this Article, one can easily point to the promulgation
of different writs at common law for the distinction and development
of the different silos in contract and property law,27 as well as, the
promulgation certain foundational statutes like the Statute of
Frauds28 in contract law, and the Wills Act29 in trusts and estates
that have shaped the rules in the respective silos.
What is crucial to the primary thesis of this Article is what I have
learned in teaching in these three different areas of silos of law. The
different silos with their different rules for enforceability have a unify-
ing principle: each silo requires the party seeking to validate a convey-
ance or transfer to demonstrate or, in the argot of law, prove that
certain functional formalities have been met. Essentially, the reason
functional formalities are required in each of these silos is so a court is
able to adjudicate with low error cost and low administrative costs.30
Thus, efficiency and fairness produce the requirement of functional
formalities in the adjudication of disputes in these three areas.31
are, however, significantly reduced by the Uniform Probate Code, which simply
requires that the putative testator substantially comply with the requisite for-
malities. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010). Indeed, it is the pri-
mary thesis of this Article that the substantial compliance doctrine in trusts and
estates promulgated by the UPC is a recognition that what the courts are looking
for in making the determination that a will is valid and enforceable is the comple-
tion of formalities by the putative testator that allows the court to make a correct
and efficient adjudication of the issue before it. See infra note 39 and accompany-
ing text.
27. Indeed, suits to enforce covenants or promises originally sounded in tort and
called for the use of the Writ of Assumpsit. See J.B. Ames, The History of Assump-
sit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1888). The various writs used to enforce contracts or cove-
nants in early common law and their breadth are addressed in FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW VOL. II 204 (1968).
28. The Statute of Frauds was enacted by the British Parliament in 1677 and became
part of American Law in Colonial America as a result. See BRUCE W. FRIER &
JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 241 (4th ed. 2019). For the
current version of the Statute of Frauds in America, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 110 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) and the U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
29. The British Parliament enacted the Wills Act in 1837 and American courts
quickly embraced its requirements. See ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 141–42 (10th ed. 2017).
30. See infra Part III.
31. In developing material to teach a seminar on conveyancing that breaks down the
barriers between the silos to focus on the different types of conveyances that are
legally enforceable, I have observed that these functional formalities are repli-
cated in many of the silos that make up our body of law. Hence, functional formal-
ities are required both with respect to voluntary and involuntary conveyances.
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New law students learning contracts must first confront and
master the doctrine of Consideration to determine when there is an
enforceable agreement. My students quickly grasp the concepts of the
benefit/detriment test courts employ to demarcate enforceable from
unenforceable promises,32 as well as the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 1 definition of consideration as “a promise or a set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty,”33 (the exchange of
promises or bargain theory of consideration). However, they quickly
become confused when I try to convince them that using either test
results in a tautology.
I prove my thesis by an examination of “dead guy” cases. These are
cases in which a putative donee claims that a transfer of an entitle-
ment was made by a putative donor that should be enforced by the
court or arbiter. What these cases have in common, epitomized by
Ricketts v. Scothorn,34 is that the putative donor is dead and the con-
veyance cannot be enforced because it lacks the magical glue of consid-
eration. It fails the bargain theory test of consideration because no
reciprocal promises were exchanged; the only promise made was a
promise by a grandfather to make a future gift of money to his grand-
daughter so that she would not be required to work to earn a living.
The conveyance also fails the benefit/detriment test because only a
benefit was legally conferred on the granddaughter nor was any legal
detriment incurred by the grandfather in making the promise to give
in the future.
I take this occasion to point out the tautological nature of consider-
ation per each test by noting that the court’s decision to enforce the
future promise would result in a promise that gives a remedy to the
granddaughter or recognizes a duty on the part of the grandfather to
perform his promise (and it would bind his estate should he die before
the time of performance). Her lawsuit seeking to enforce the grandfa-
ther’s intent would also constitute acceptance of the gift creating an
exchange of promise—the offer of a future gift by the grandfather and
the acceptance by the granddaughter.
Similarly, a decision by the court to enforce the grandfather’s
promise would satisfy the benefit/detriment test because it would re-
sult in the creation of a benefit in the granddaughter and a detriment
in the grandfather. It is the court’s determination that there is no con-
sideration that causes the conveyance to fail both tests used by courts
to determine if there is consideration. That is a tautology. The reason
why a contract is enforceable is because the court finds consideration,
and consideration is required to make a contract enforceable.
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
33. FRIER & WHITE, supra note 28 at 34.
34. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
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Once the students are convinced that consideration is a tautology
capable of manipulation by the courts to find an enforceable agree-
ment, they become even more puzzled about the requirement of con-
sideration when they learn that the fact pattern Ricketts represents is
often enforced by courts even though it allegedly lacks legal or formal
consideration. This is because such promises are enforceable via the
doctrine of promissory estoppel or reliance.
This Article addresses the three types of promissory estoppel cases
that are normatively distinct, yet are treated as promissory estoppel
cases largely as a result of an historical anomaly. They are treated as
contract-like cases because the only legal writ that provided an appro-
priate remedy developed in contract law as a result of more flexible
pleading requirements for contract causes of action when compared to
the precise pleading rules employed in other related fields such as
property and wills and trusts.
In addition to what this Article characterizes as the prototypical
promissory estoppel case, which is precontractual and premised on an
impending commercial or business relationship,35 this Article exam-
ines modern, idiosyncratic promissory estoppel cases (those premised
on public policy)—which this Article denominates as conscionable—as
well as the older, gift-like common law promissory estoppel cases
(those premised on donative intent)—which this Article denominates
as donative.36 This Article contends that the latter two types of prom-
issory estoppel cases, conscionable and donative, have expanded con-
tract law to encompass cases outside the scope of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 because they involve neither a promise by a
promisor or reliance by a putative promisee.
With respect to the category of cases that are characterized as don-
ative, this Article contends that the remedy of promissory estoppel is
employed when there is clearly no consideration and the promisee has
not reasonably relied or relied at all on any promise by the promisor.
Instead, these are donative or putative gift cases. However, in these
reliance cases, neither testamentary nor inter vivos formalities are
met to support either a valid completed gift or a will transfer via a
validly attested will, even though the court is subsequently convinced
of the donor’s donative intent. These cases are unique in that the rem-
edy is not measured by the loss or damage incurred by the promisee
(i.e., reliance costs).
Instead, the remedy provided in the donative cases is cabined by
the proof of donative intent that identifies with specificity the exact
35. These are cases in which certain civil law countries would apply culpa en con-
trahendo. For a discussion of this rather interesting doctrine, see infra notes
112–14 and accompanying text.
36. Indeed, this Article contends that these cases are better cast and treated as in-
complete gift cases because the putative donor dies before delivery can be made.
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nature and character of the item to be transferred from donor to do-
nee. That specific and limited remedy reduces adjudicative and error
costs by fixing the scope of the court’s inquiry to something that is
concrete and provable: What is the property subject to the donative
intent?
These uncompleted gift cases should be evaluated by either can-
nons established in property law, where inter vivos gift transfers are
validated, or by trusts and estates law, where testamentary transfers
are validated. Given that most, if not all, of the uncompleted gift cases
are created as a result of the putative donor’s death and the eviden-
tiary challenges that are created as a result of that death, this Article
concludes that these cases are best evaluated pursuant to trusts and
estates or will law. To be more specific, these cases should be decided
per the principles and rules promulgated by the Uniform Probate
Code and its focus on substantial compliance and harmless error.37
Similarly, in the public policy cases employing promissory estop-
pel, there is neither a promise nor reliance by the aggrieved party, yet
a remedy is provided consistent with the court’s conception of equity
and fairness. In these rather atypical cases, courts act creatively to
fashion a remedy for a wrong for which there is no other appropriate,
pleadable cause of action and no facts indicating the parties contem-
plated, discussed, or considered a contract. Indeed, different legal
norms and doctrines validate the enforceability of both donative and
public policy cases. However, those norms and doctrines are not con-
tractual (therefore, not requiring consideration) and are not based on
reliance, which is or should be necessary to support a claim of promis-
sory estoppel.
To prove these three types of promissory estoppel cases are norma-
tively distinct, requiring the application of different doctrines from dif-
ferent areas of law, this Article focuses on the relationship of the
parties at the time the alleged injury occurs. As a result, this Article
concludes that the three different relationships require use of differ-
ent norms to determine if a remedy will be provided when there
clearly is no agreement supported by consideration and typically no
provable reliance on the part of the promisee.
I struggle to make the reliance doctrine and promissory estoppel
relevant and understandable when teaching Contract Law to first-
37. Substantial compliance and harmless error are two distinct but related curative
doctrines developed to validate improperly attested wills when there is signifi-
cant and compelling evidence of the testator’s intent. Given that evidence of tes-
tatorial intent, courts then validate the improperly attested will confident that in
doing so they are giving effect to the deceased testator’s will.
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year law students.38 First, of course, is the anomaly that in the typical
reliance case there is no agreement supported by consideration and, as
a result, no enforceable contract. This focus on the lack of considera-
tion is puzzling to the students after I have begun the course by em-
phasizing the importance of consideration to the determination of
whether there is an enforceable contract per classical contract the-
ory.39 That absence of consideration is the primary focus of reliance as
the exception to the rule that enforceable agreements must be sup-
ported by consideration. That absence has prompted some scholars to
contend that use of the reliance doctrine through the remedy of prom-
issory estoppel has caused the death of classical contracts.40
In addition to the evisceration of the requirement of consideration
to establish enforceability, I also find these cases difficult to teach be-
cause of the variety of factual circumstances that have employed the
doctrine to find an enforceable agreement. My students seem to intui-
tively agree with the courts’ decisions in contract-like cases such as
Midwest Energy, Inc. v. Orion Food Systems41 that hold a remedy
should be provided for the equivalent of what some have characterized
as promissory fraud.42
The students are also sympathetic to claims made by putative do-
nees in cases similar to Ricketts.43 Like me, they struggle with identi-
fying how the promisee relied on a promise to receive money from her
grandfather when there was no material change in her position based
on the promise.44 They also struggle with cases that find a contract
remedy and award damages in cases like Cohen v. Cowles Media,
Inc.,45 in which neither of us can find a promise that is relied on by the
38. I am a relatively new teacher of Contract Law, having taught the course five
times in the last seven years. By comparison, I have taught Property to first-year
law students approximately thirty times since I began teaching in 1980.
39. I use Frier and White’s casebook on contracts, which first follows cases that ad-
dress the requirement of consideration, then cases that address the remedy of
restitution. FRIER & WHITE, supra note 30 at 78–107.
40. Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61–66 (2d ed. 1995). See also Timothy J.
Sullivan, Book Review, The Death of Contract, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 403, 420
(1975).
41. Midwest Energy, Inc. v. Orion Food Sys., 14 S.W.3d 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
42. See Gregory Klass & Ian Ayres, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 507 (2004). But I do not think of these cases as pure promissory fraud. For a
discussion of my characterization of promissory fraud, see infra Part III. Instead,
I see these particular cases as filling a gap created by American common law’s
rejection of the doctrine of culpa en contrahendo. See infra notes 112–14 and ac-
companying text. I contend that the promissory fraud doctrine is most apt for the
cases I denominate as conscionable, calling for the use of the court’s equitable
powers to provide a remedy to redress a wrong.
43. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
44. Id.
45. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
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promisee and no action is taken in reliance by the injured or aggrieved
promisee.
We finally come to the conclusion in class that there are three
types of reliance cases that are factually and normatively unrelated.
First, there are contract-based or commercial cases in which the par-
ties have established some sort of business relationship (negotiating
parties, for example) that has not reached fruition, if fruition is
deemed to be an enforceable contract. Specifically, the court does not
find an enforceable agreement supported by consideration, but does
find an injury that supports a remedy.46 Although some characterize
these cases as a type of promissory fraud,47 a more apt doctrine to
categorize these cases is culpa en contrahendo.48
Second, there are family relationship cases that create promises
and expectations that equitably call for the use of promissory estoppel
to find an enforceable promise even though the promise does not rise
to the level of consideration that supports the imposition of a remedy
to the putative promisee.49 These are characterized as donative intent
cases. To be more precise, these are failed donative intent cases be-
cause delivery is not technically accomplished by the putative donor to
the putative donee before the putative donor’s death. In all of these
cases, the one fact that unites them is that the putative donor is dead
and the executor of the putative donor’s estate is refusing to honor the
putative donor’s promise.
The lack of delivery by the now-deceased putative donor should be
characterized as an estate problem caused by the (usually unantici-
pated) death of the putative donor. This Article contends that these
failed gift cases should be enforced, if at all, under the rubric of sub-
stantial compliance. The Uniform Probate Code developed the doc-
trine of substantial compliance to validate testamentary transfers
when the donor does not comply precisely with the rituals prescribed
by the applicable Wills Act at the time of the testator’s death.50
Third and finally, there are unique relationships that give rise to
duties created and imposed by public policy that support the use of
promissory estoppel to provide a remedy to the aggrieved or injured
party and can be breached.51 In these “conscionability” cases, the ag-
46. Promissory Estoppel is used in these cases because the United States has largely
rejected the doctrine of culpa en contrahendo which this Article will discuss in
greater detail. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
47. See Klass & Ayres, supra note 42.
48. See infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
49. It is my contention that these family cases are in reality uncompleted gift or don-
ative transfers and should be covered in property and trusts and estates law.
50. For further discussion of this point, see supra notes 28–31 and accompanying
text.
51. These cases are harder to characterize as appropriate for the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel, but I contend that they are explicable given the relationship of the
940 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:926
grieved party seeks to employ the court’s equitable powers to provide a
remedy to redress a wrong. Although much scholarship has focused on
the doctrine of unconscionability, little attention has been given to its
mirror image—cases in which courts use the doctrine of reliance or
promissory estoppel to produce an effective remedy based on equity
and fairness.
These atypical reliance cases are essentially contextual and do not
fit into traditional doctrinal areas with settled remedies. Instead, they
have migrated into the flexible catch all category of reliance per the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90. The problem, as this Article
addresses, is that the reliance-based remedy provided by § 90 is inef-
fective and inapposite when applied to these cases. Typically, there is
no reliance on the part of the aggrieved party, and even if there is, the
damages that are awarded bear no relation to the costs incurred based
on that reliance.
Note that in this trifecta of promissory estoppel cases the focus is
on the relationship between the parties and how that relationship re-
sults in the creation of enforceable rights. In the precontractual rela-
tionship cases, the relationship is founded on a business (i.e.,
economic) purpose in which each party seeks to enter into an agree-
ment that is pareto optimal.52 In the donative cases, the relationship
is typically familial or something close to it. In the atypical reliance
cases (i.e., the conscionability cases where it would be unconscionable
not to provide a remedy), the relationship is defined by what it is not.
It is not a business or a familial relationship. Yet it is a voluntary
relationship that ultimately leads to harm that is foreseeable and
preventable.53
Interestingly, these three disparate relationships all result in the
enforcement of those promises via promissory estoppel even though
they lack consideration, thereby precluding the finding of an enforcea-
ble contractual agreement. This raises an interesting question about
these three normatively distinct types: Should any of these types of
reliance cases continue to be governed by contract law and principles
now that their normative base has been identified?
This Article contends that only the contract-based commercial
cases are truly promissory estoppel cases calling for the use of the Re-
parties and the harms occasioned thereby. See infra notes 115–17 and accompa-
nying text.
52. Pareto optimal or Pareto efficiency “concerns the satisfaction of individual prefer-
ences. A particular situation is said to be Pareto or allocatively efficient if it is
impossible to change it so as to make at least one person better off (in his own
estimation) without making another person worse off.” ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 14 (6th ed. 2014).
53. Why aren’t these harms remedied via a tort cause of action? Because the forms of
pleading in tort and property limited the causes of action that could be brought.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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statement Second of Contracts § 90. To the contrary, the donee cases
should properly be considered as incomplete gift transactions that
should be evaluated pursuant to the rules of property and trusts and
estates law, not contract law.54 The tricky cases are cases that are not
based on either: (1) a business foundation or relationship or (2) a fa-
milial foundation or a preexisting long-term relationship. These cases
employing promissory estoppel represent the olio of contract law and
are hard to square with the concept of reliance. This Article contends
that these cases call for the use of the court’s equitable powers to pro-
vide a remedy when the aggrieved party is in a relationship with the
other party that implicates a public policy concern. This Article will
address each type of promissory estoppel case in turn.
The three types of reliance cases—contract-based, donative, and
public policy—are neither purely donative transactions (i.e., gifts) nor
agreements supported by the traditional definition of consideration,
yet they are enforced under the rubric of reliance. The key question is:
What differentiates these cases from enforceable contracts (that is,
donative promises and agreements supported by consideration)? Once
one recognizes that no consideration is present in reliance cases, one
must develop a theory identifying which otherwise unenforceable
agreements are properly the subject of reliance and which are not.
The confluence of the heretofore unidentified factors dictates which
of these otherwise unenforceable agreements are remediable (in effect,
enforced) through the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The first factor
is closely related to valid donative transfers but does not satisfy the
requirement of a valid donative transfer. In other words, donative in-
tent is present in the donative reliance cases, but some intervening act
(usually death of the putative donor) precludes completion of the don-
ative transfer by precluding delivery.55
The second type of reliance cases are not pre-contractual, lacking
donative intent, and cannot be viewed as failed delivery cases. These
cases do not neatly fit within a tight template with recognizable and
categorizable fact patterns. Quite the contrary, their fact patterns
range from promises to maintain anonymity56 and repudiated
promises of employment57 to cases repudiating strict interpretation of
insurance policies.58 There are two factors that create these conscio-
nable cases. First, and perhaps most importantly, these cases arise
when a relationship between the parties implicates a larger public pol-
icy concern. Second, these cases lack an otherwise effective remedy.
54. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
55. For further discussion, see infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992).
57. See, e.g., Grouse v. Grp. Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
58. See, e.g., Hetchler v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 254 N.W. 221 (Mich. 1934).
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Indeed, in a somewhat ironic manner, the flexible writ of assump-
sit to right wrongs at the birth of common law is the logical ancestor
and progenitor of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the use of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 to validate the same.59
Hence, just as the demise of the use of the seal to establish valid and
enforceable contracts led to the development of the doctrine of consid-
eration to supply that functional role, the development of pleading re-
quirements and the demise of assumpsit created a gap in the remedial
scheme to redress wrongs. Thus, § 90 emerged as a necessary corol-
lary to inflexible pleadings that failed to remedy all wrongs.
After treating Ricketts as a pure contract case to demonstrate the
tautological nature of consideration and the loophole created by the
court’s use of promissory estoppel to enforce the grandfather’s promise
as a failed gift,60 I return to the facts of the case and press the stu-
dents to apply the two consideration tests. In particular, I ask them if
the grandfather had the intent to enter into a contract with his grand-
daughter. Applying both the bargain theory and the benefit/detriment
tests to determine if consideration was present, the students quickly
conclude that given the familial relationship and the grandfather’s in-
tent, the grandfather was not seeking to establish and enforceable
contract. Instead, they almost universally conclude that the grandfa-
ther was attempting to make a gift to his granddaughter.
Here is the first problem with the creation of silos in legal
academia. At this stage of their legal career at the University of Vir-
ginia Law School, most first-year law students have not yet been ex-
posed to property law. One of the major benefits in teaching courses in
different silos is that, as a property professor, I can explain to them in
contracts why the grandfather’s promise to the granddaughter was
not a valid gift. I explain to them that a valid gift requires intent,
delivery, and acceptance.61 What Ricketts lacked was delivery from
the grandfather to the granddaughter before the grandfather’s death.
Hence, no gift in the property law silo and, as addressed above, no
enforceable contract if consideration is required.
Why Ricketts is a contract case and not a property case is no doubt
due to the fact that at the time Ricketts was litigated, contract law
gave the courts a remedial loophole to enforce the grandfather’s intent
post-mortem that was not available if enforceability of the promise
was sought as a valid inter vivos gift. Because the grandfather’s estate
could be sued to enforce the conveyance based on a theory of estoppel
en pais (at that time, the pleading equivalent of promissory estoppel
or reliance), the granddaughter used contract law to enforce or com-
59. See, e.g., supra note 29 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
61. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 4.
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plete the conveyance. That remedial avenue was unavailable in the
property law at that time.
What the students do not learn while studying contract law but are
exposed to while studying property law is the law of gifts. Contracts
does not address why the promise made by the grandfather to the
granddaughter is not enforced as a valid gift. Property, on the other
hand, teaches the law of gift transactions. Although students have
each participated in the giving and receiving of gifts, most of them
have not considered the legal requirements that create an enforceable
gift. Understandably, those requirements are not given much thought
because typically a gift is simply made or not. Very rarely, if at all,
does one hear or learn about a lawsuit to enforce a gift promise.62
An analysis of Ricketts from the contracts silo juxtaposed against
the gift transactions principles in the property silo presents a conun-
drum, the answer to which is the thesis of this Article. The use of the
seal should be allowed to permit the promisor to make an enforceable
promise irrespective of consideration. The conundrum is quite simple:
the grandfather’s purported conveyance is invalid in property law be-
cause one of the functional formalities for a valid gift is delivery,
which the gift in Ricketts lacked. The grandfather’s promise to make a
gift in the future also fails to be enforceable contract because it lacks
consideration. However, the promise is enforceable based on the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel.63 How can that be?
These three outcomes can only be resolved or harmonized if it is
recognized and acknowledged that the functional formalities required
for a valid gift or contract are not ends but means to an end. The end
is the production evidence that allows a court (especially when one
party to the transaction is dead) to produce an optimal result in dis-
pute resolution of the dispute. That result is to come to the correct
decision with low adjudicative costs and no or low error costs. The rea-
son why the grandfather’s promise is enforced against his estate using
the loophole of promissory estoppel is because the court is convinced of
the grandfather’s intent given the evidence presented.64 The absence
of the functional formalities with a finding of a valid conveyance
proves that the functional formalities are means and not ends. The
applicable ends in deciding to enforce a conveyance is correct and effi-
cient adjudication.
Consequently, although the means are the enumeration and use of
functional formalities that require delivery for a valid gift or the con-
62. Indeed, there are no cases in which the putative donee claims there was a valid
gift promise and the living putative donor claims to the contrary.
63. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
64. Using a sealed document to make a promise when the donor’s or transferor’s in-
tent is clear provides even more stable and reliable evidentiary evidence regard-
ing the transferor’s intent. See infra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
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sideration for a valid enforceable contract, the end is the production of
evidence that later allows a court to correctly and efficiently adjudi-
cate a dispute. The functional formalities are designed and required to
produce that evidence, but as Ricketts demonstrates, they are not the
sole vehicle to produce such evidence. Instead, Ricketts had sufficient
evidence to enforce the grandfather’s promise irrespective of its failure
to become a valid gift or enforceable contract.65
After having exposed Contracts students to the requirement of con-
sideration, I attempt to convince Property students that the functional
formalities required in the property silo are means to an end exactly
like the functional formalities are means to an end in the contract silo.
I do so by closely analyzing cases like Gruen v. Gruen,66 in which a son
alleged that his deceased father made a gift to him of a very valuable
painting that the father possessed at the time of his death.
In Gruen, the father’s wife at the time of his death alleged that no
gift was made during her husband’s life and that the painting there-
fore remained in her deceased husband’s estate.67 If the property was
in his estate at the time of his death, the surviving spouse presumably
has some claim for at least a portion of the value of the painting.68
The issue was whether the gift was valid, as the painting was not
physically delivered to the son contemporaneously with the expression
of the father’s stated intent to make the gift.69 As such, it lacked the
required formality of delivery. In fact, the painting remained in the
father’s physical possession until his death.70 However, the court held
that the father had given his son a vested remainder in the painting,
retaining the equivalent of a life estate that obviated the need for a
physical delivery of the painting from the father to the son.71
65. The dead guy cases represent one of three types of contract cases in which the
courts use promissory estoppel or reliance to vitiate the need for consideration.
The other two types of reliance cases are precontractual promise cases and con-
scionable reliance cases. These are addressed in detail in Part III. See infra notes
115–16 and accompanying text.
66. Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).
67. Id. at 869.
68. Depending on the couple’s marital domicile, the surviving spouse may have a
claim to an elective share of the decedent’s estate in a separate property jurisdic-
tion or she may claim an ownership interest in the painting if the marital domi-
cile is a community property jurisdiction and the painting was acquired with
marital assets. For a discussion of a spouse’s elective share in a separate property
jurisdiction, see SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 29 at 520–23 (10th ed. 2017).
69. See Gruen, 496 N.E.2d at 872.
70. Indeed, the delivery of a future interest in an item of personal property like a
painting is very similar the delivery of a testamentary gift in the middle ages by
which the donor retained a life estate in the item. Making a will created an irrev-
ocable gift of a future interest in the donee. This type of gift was called a post-obit
gift. See Johnson, Is It Time for Irrevocable Wills?, supra note 15, at 402.
71. Because the father retained a life estate in the painting, the court deemed it
pointless to require him to physically deliver it to the son when the son would
2020] IRREVOCABLE GIFT PROMISES 945
In most cases, the requirement of acceptance is not at issue be-
cause the gift has significant value; there are at least two parties
claiming ownership of the item. Consequently, when deciding whether
the putative donor has made a valid gift, the focus is on the require-
ments of intent and delivery. Did the donor intend to make a present
gift of the item in question and did she validate that intent by making
some sort of delivery of the item in question?72
After considering a series of gift transaction cases, I ask my stu-
dents to think of what common fact pattern recurs in each case. It
takes some time and hints, but eventually they realize that the puta-
tive donor is dead in all of the gift cases discussed and these cases
represent another species of dead guy cases. They are dead guy cases
being enforced as gifts using property law doctrines, as opposed to con-
tract law. Because intent plays such a large role in the gift cases, the
fact that the putative donor is dead is not only a commonality among
these cases, but is almost a necessity in order to create a triable legal
dispute over the gift. Were the putative donor alive, she could simply
state that there was no intent to make a gift. If that statement is
made, there is no gift.73
I then return to an analysis of the Ricketts case and prod them to
see that the issue in Ricketts is exactly the same as the issue in Gruen.
In both cases the putative donor/promisor seeks to make a future gift
to a putative donee/promisee. Further, in both cases the putative do-
nor/promisor is dead and their estate is being sued to enforce the puta-
tive donor/promisor’s clear intent to make a future conveyance.74
have to then return the painting to the father to give effect to his retained life
estate. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d at 874. This case demonstrates that it is possible to
make a valid and enforceable gift without a physical delivery when there is suffi-
cient evidence of donative intent. Id.
72. This Article says “some sort of delivery” because as demonstrated in Gruen, a
present gift of at least a future interest can be made without a delivery. Id. In
addition, the requirement of delivery is complicated by the fact that there are
multiple ways to make delivery of a valid gift, including constructive (the means
of access to the thing that is the subject of the gift like keys to a car) and symbolic
(something that symbolizes the gift like a tuning key to a piano) delivery. See id.
73. This assumes, of course, that the putative donee is not claiming that she entered
into a contract supported by consideration. With respect to the distinction be-
tween gifts and contracts, see Johnson, supra note 8, at 585.
74. The estate is being sued in both cases because the executor has an incentive not
to deliver property to a putative donee/promissee if there is any legal question
regarding the enforceability of the promise. If the executor distributes property of
the estate improperly, that is, to someone who has no valid and enforceable claim,
the executor may subsequently be liable to the beneficiaries of that estate for the
diminution in value of the estate caused by inappropriate transfer of estate as-
sets. Hence, cautious executors will not transfer estate assets outside of the pro-
bate process unless the executor is convinced that such a transfer results in little
or no probability that a court will later adjudicate that such a transfer was inap-
propriate. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 29 at 43. See also Thomas C.
Boyer, Personal Liability of Executors and Administrators for Decedents’ Federal
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This commonality is masked by the siloed contexts of the law
school curriculum. In the gift context, the putative donor is dead and
the combatants are the putative donee and the recipients of the do-
nor’s estate.75 Someone is going to receive the property that is the sub-
ject of the dispute without paying any consideration—either the
putative donor or the recipient of the donor’s estate. Neither party is
claiming that there was a mere gratuitous promise made by the puta-
tive and now deceased donor. The putative donee is claiming that a
completed gift was made prior to the donor’s death while the taker
pursuant to the will is claiming to the contrary.76
In the contracts context, the death of a party is atypical and the
presumption is that both parties are alive at the litigation of the dis-
pute. In these cases, one party is alleging that a promise was made
and that the presence of consideration means the promise can be en-
forced against the promisor notwithstanding the fact that the prom-
isor would currently opt not to honor the promise if given a choice. The
other party, stylized herein as the promisor, may admit making the
promise but claims that the promise is unenforceable because it is not
supported by consideration. Neither party is alleging that there is a
mere gratuitous promise motivated by donative intent.77
Upon closer inspection, both of the above contexts involve examina-
tion and resolution of the same issue: Is there a promise that courts
Tax Liability, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 452 (1968). The failure of a functional formality,
delivery with a purported gift, and the lack of consideration with respect to a
purported enforceable contract creates the lack of legal certainty that will cause
an executor not to honor a donor/promisor’s clear and proven intent to make a
future transfer. Courts’ validation of that intent by dispensing either with the
requirement of delivery (gift) or consideration (contract) provides the executor
with the safe harbor to make such a transfer free of any potential legal claim by
those taking the decedent’s estate. Indeed, in these dead guy cases the legal bat-
tle over the asset and whether there has been an enforceable conveyance is be-
tween two set of putative donees—the inter vivos donees (the granddaughter in
Ricketts and the son in Gruen) and the testate donees (those entitled to the estate
of the putative donor/promisor).
75. If the identity of the putative donee and the recipient of the item or property in
the will are one in the same, there would be no lawsuit because that person will
receive the item in any case.
76. One way to defeat the claim is for the individual opposing the gift to demonstrate
that a promise was made to make a gift but it was never completed via delivery.
The point is that in gift cases the focus is on the three requirements necessary to
effectuate a completed gift. In contracts the focus is on consideration or the lack
thereof and not on any party’s intent, delivery, or acceptance.
77. It should be self-evident that if the alleged promisor is alive, the putative prom-
isee will always allege that a contract with consideration has been executed. To
the contrary, if the putative promisee alleges a donative transfer, the promisor
will prevail by simply stating that there was no intent to make a gift. See supra
note 75 and accompanying text.
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will enforce later when the promising party is either deceased78 or
claims that no valid and enforceable promise was made?79 In the gift
transaction context with the deceased putative donor, the putative do-
nee’s claims concern whether the putative donor intended to make a
gift, whether it was communicated (i.e., promised to the donee or not),
and whether the donee has the right to enforce that intent (i.e., prom-
ise) against the donor’s estate.
In the contract transaction context, both parties may acknowledge
the fact that a promise (i.e., expression of the intent to make a trans-
fer) was made, but one party is claiming the promise is enforceable
and the other not.80 In effect, one of the parties is claiming there was
no intent to make a gift and because intent and delivery are lacking,81
it is clear that the promise cannot be enforced as a gift. There must be
some other legal principle, however, to create an enforceable legal
promise. In contract law, that legal principle is consideration.82
In the gift transaction context, the court must determine the do-
nor’s intent notwithstanding the donor’s death and inability to testify.
In the contract transaction context, the court must determine whether
to enforce a promise when the two parties to that promise present con-
flicting evidence regarding the presence or absence of consideration.
However, in both contexts the court is called upon to do essentially
the same thing: decide whether to complete a transaction when there
are two opposing views or claims regarding whether the transaction
should be enforced. Although the remedy sought is the same in both
contexts—the movant is seeking to enforce or complete a transac-
tion—the reason these similar cases are treated as dissimilar by stu-
dents and academics is that gift transactions arise and are covered in
the silo of property law while contract transactions arise in the silo of
contract law.
78. As discussed throughout this Article, in cases in which the donee is claiming that
a valid gift was made, the common fact pattern is the death of the putative donor
as a prerequisite to litigation.
79. This latter situation does not involve a putative gift transaction but instead
raises the question of whether there is a valid and enforceable contract.
80. Again, assuming acceptance is a given, the key questions are intent and delivery.
Given the death of the donor, as a practical matter these two requirements often
collapse into one issue; delivery is often proven by intent when physical delivery
is lacking and intent is often proven (or assumed) by the fact that there has been
a delivery. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
82. If the transaction is not treated or analyzed as a gift and the party seeking to
validate the transaction cannot demonstrate that there is consideration either
pursuant to the bargain theory or the benefit/detriment test, the party seeking to
validate the conveyance may attempt to use promissory estoppel or reliance as
the appropriate vehicle to validate the conveyance even though there are no func-
tional formalities. See supra notes 36–61 and accompanying text.
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The courts have developed what this Article calls functional for-
malities as a prerequisite to the enforceability of either gift or contract
transactions in an attempt to correctly and efficiently resolve disputes
in these different contexts. In other words, the requirements of intent
and delivery for gift transactions and consideration for contract trans-
actions were developed as prerequisites to enforceable agreements in
order to provide the court with evidence to be used in determining
whether to enforce the promise.83
Those formalities and the functions they perform for the court are
addressed in Part III. Importantly, the two allegedly dissimilar con-
texts of property and contract law produce the same judicial resolu-
tion: the development of safe harbor formalities that are functional
and are designed to be used when there is a conflict to correctly adju-
dicate the matter. These safe harbor formalities are designed to pro-
duce an outcome that is correct (i.e., has a low risk of error) and to be
achieved at relatively low administrative or adjudicative costs (which
enforces efficiency norms).
The use of functional formalities to validate transfers appears in
other areas of the law as well. Indeed, the presence of certain func-
tional formalities in trusts and estates law proves this Article’s thesis
that it is the presence of those formalities and the function that they
provide that allows courts to later validate or invalidate inter vivos or
testamentary conveyances. As noted, the Wills Act, or Statute of Wills,
requires certain formalities in order to validate a will and the trans-
fers that subsequently take place in probate as a result.
What this Article has neglected to address is the importance of the
will in distributing the decedent’s assets following death. The will al-
lows the putative testator to make a future gift based on a previous
intent—perhaps an intent that was expressed many years before the
decedent’s death.84 Because of functional formalities, a putative testa-
83. When consideration and the gift formalities are lacking and there are no provable
functional formalities, contract law provides a loophole for enforceability per the
doctrine of promissory estoppel or reliance. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
84. For example, the putative decedent may have her will drafted and executed with
all of the attendant formalities in 2005. In that will the decedent may express her
intent to give her expensive automobile to her only brother. If the putative dece-
dent dies in 2019 with the unchanged will in effect and owning the same automo-
bile, that automobile will be transferred, that is, conveyed to the brother in 2019
based on an intent expressed in 2005. Of course, wills are not irrevocable and it is
conceivable that sometime between 2005 and 2019 the will may be revoked or
modified. On the revocability of wills, see Johnson, Is It Time for Irrevocable
Wills?, supra note 15. The decedent must still own the automobile at the time of
her death (or an automobile obtained to replace the automobile mentioned in the
unrevoked will) or the gift of the automobile will be adeemed and invalid. For a
discussion of the doctrine of ademption, see SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note
29, at 373–82.
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tor by making a will can accomplish what the grandfather attempted
to accomplish in Ricketts in making a gift in the future with no con-
temporaneous delivery.
The only distinction between what the grandfather wanted to ac-
complish in Ricketts and what a putative testator accomplishes with
the execution of a valid will is that in Ricketts, the grandfather in-
tended the gift to be inter vivos and, presumably, irrevocable.85 As the
testator is dead at the time of the resolution of any issues arising from
the will, the functional formalities are designed to allow the adjudicat-
ing court to decide whether to enforce the will at low administrative
cost and with little attendant error, just like in the gift and contract
contexts.86
What is also often ignored is that a will represents a completed
future gift. This violates the maxim that one may not make a future
gift. Quite the contrary, if one complies with the requisite functional
formalities, one can indeed complete a valid and enforceable future
gift or conveyance. The will completes the donative transaction pursu-
ant to which the testator decides to make a gift, complies with certain
formalities in order to accomplish that gift, and takes no contrary ac-
tion invalidating that intent before delivery/death (i.e., modification
via a codicil or revocation of the will).87 The testator dies in compli-
ance with the intent to make the gift as expressed in the will, and the
gift is completed following the testator’s death in compliance with that
previously expressed intent.
This testamentary gift has all the attributes of the typical inter
vivos gift except that delivery is performed after the owner’s death.
Intent is expressed in the will, satisfying that requirement, and the
item shall be delivered by the person charged with distributing the
assets in the estate.88 Finally, as with inter vivos gifts, the donee or
recipient of the testamentary gift has the right to reject the gift so that
acceptance is part and parcel of a completed gift.89
Thus far, this Article has discussed and addressed three types of
enforceable transfers: (1) inter vivos gifts, (2) contracts supported by
consideration, and (3) testamentary gifts or transfers made pursuant
to a properly executed will. Although these three transfers are en-
85. Wills are revocable by definition. One cannot make an irrevocable will. See John-
son, Is It Time for Irrevocable Wills?, supra note 15, at 394.
86. Id. at 401–02.
87. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
88. This person is normally called the executor with respect to the will and has a
fiduciary duty to carry out the wishes or intent of the testator as expressed in the
will. The executor should be viewed as the agent of the testator and as an agent
carrying out the wishes of the testator.
89. The recipient or legatee of the testator’s generosity has the right to reject the gift
via a process known as disclaimer. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-1101–2-1107
(amended 2010).
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forceable if the requisite functional formalities are supplied, none re-
present a pure enforceable promise binding the promisor in a way that
is unalterable. That is the province of the trust—in particular, the in-
ter vivos irrevocable trust.90
If the putative donor, say grandfather Ricketts, desires to make a
future gift of an asset that is irrevocable at the time the intent to
make the gift or conveyance is present, the putative donor may do so
through the use of an inter vivos irrevocable trust. Trusts may be rev-
ocable or irrevocable. By using a valid irrevocable inter vivos trust, the
settlor has the power to divorce herself from ownership in the asset by
making a transfer that eliminates her ownership interest. Thus, a set-
tlor, A, can establish a trust where the trustee is the settlor or a third
person, and that grants a life estate or interest in beneficiary A, with a
remainder to A’s children equally (if any), and in default of such issue,
to the settlor’s alma mater, the University of Virginia School of Law.
By this act, the settlor has made an irreversible donative transfer
that will benefit A, A’s children (if any), and, if none, the University of
Virginia School of Law. The ultimate beneficiary of the corpus of the
trust will be determined by whether A has any children,91 but after
the creation of the trust the settlor cannot alter the disposition of the
property except manage it as a trustee if the settlor sets up the trust
with the settlor as trustee. If the settlor is not the trustee, the settlor
will have no connection to the property after the creation of the
trust.92
Alternatively, the settlor can set up an irrevocable trust in which
the settlor retains a life estate interest, with a discretionary power to
consume the corpus. If this occurs, then the use of an irrevocable
trust, although still irrevocable, has no real impact on the settlor’s do-
minion and control over the trust assets. While the trust cannot be
revoked, this irrevocable trust creates no measurable or valuable in-
terest to the remainderman, be it A’s children or the University of Vir-
ginia School of Law, because of the settlor’s discretionary right to
consume the corpus of the trust. Who would pay anything of value for
90. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
91. This assumes that A has no children at the time the trust is created. If that is the
case, the equitable title to the property is life estate in A, contingent remainder in
A’s children, alternative contingent remainder in UVA Law. Once a child is born
to A, the children’s remainder turns into a vested remainder subject to open to
allow addition children born or adopted by A to share in the trust corpus when A
dies.
92. To be technical, because the settlor set up the trust with alternative contingent
remainders, at law the settlor would be regarded as holding a reversion. In equity
the settlor would not be regarded as retaining that interest because with this gift,
UVA Law is the intended beneficiary should A have no children and therefore the
gift or corpus must be transferred to UVA Law no matter how the preceding life
estate terminates.
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the remainderman’s interest that is contingent on the failure of the
settlor to consume the assets prior to death? The power of consump-
tion gives the settlor the right to deplete the trust in its entirety.
The point is simple: the irrevocable inter vivos trust provides the
putative donor with a flexible vehicle to make a future gift of a present
asset based on that putative donor’s intent at the time the irrevocable
inter vivos trust is established. If Mr. Ricketts had consulted a lawyer
and told her of his intent to make an inter vivos gift of a present asset
in the future to his granddaughter, he should have been advised to
execute an irrevocable inter vivos trust. By that devise, the putative
donor can expand the typology of valid transactions to include a
fourth, the irrevocable inter vivos trust, which makes erroneous the
oft-stated maxim in property law that one cannot make a future gift.
What this Article hopes to demonstrate next in Part III is that in-
ter vivos gifts, inter vivos trusts, and wills (including testamentary
trusts which are trusts that are created in a validly executed and en-
forced will) are related and united by functional formalities that allow
a court to later adjudicate the claim of ownership at low administra-
tive costs and little to no error costs. Given that the focus is on validat-
ing the settlor’s intent with respect to these trusts, what is it about
these trusts, with their lack of functional formality, that causes them
to be enforceable?
In Part III, this Article contends that the use of “magic words” in
the creation of “informal” oral trusts and knowledge of what those
words mean allows the court to find a trust when other formalities are
lacking, like delivery and acceptance with respect to gifts, witnessing
or attestation with respect to wills, and a written document with re-
spect to trusts that affect land. If these magic words, when spoken by
the putative settlor, are sufficient to validate the settlor’s intent to
create a trust, a gift promise made with a seal should serve the same
functional purpose, allowing courts to enforce gift promises at low ad-
ministrative cost with little attendant error costs.
III. ENFORCEABLE OR UNENFORCEABLE: A FUNCTION OF
FORMALITIES
Courts enforce future donative promises because each complies
with certain functional formalities. These functional formalities pro-
vide courts with the assurance that the putative donor intended a don-
ative transaction. In other words, each one of these future donative
promises satisfies the ritualistic, cautionary, and evidentiary func-
tions addressed by the delivery requirement with respect to valid and
completed inter vivos gifts.93
93. Again, testamentary gifts are the province of wills.
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For example, consider future donative promises made in an irrevo-
cable trust. These enforceable promises must meet the following re-
quirements: the settlor must have and demonstrate the intent to
create a trust, the settlor must identify a beneficiary or beneficiaries
of the trust, the settlor must identify the trust res,94 and the settlor’s
intent to make the trust irrevocable must be clear in an age when the
default rule is to make trusts revocable.95 When the settlor/donor
meets these requirements, she clearly satisfies the requirement that
she evinced sufficient intent to make a gift.
In addition, the settlor/donor has completed the appropriate ritual
to establish the inter vivos trust containing the donative promise, as
well as the cautionary role by making the gift irrevocable. Essentially,
she is aware that she is making a gift in the future that may impover-
ish her and she is embracing an irreversible precommitment strategy.
By creating an irrevocable trust with a trustee, the settlor/donor pro-
vides the court with sufficient evidence of the terms of the future don-
ative promise when she is dead.96
The fact that the creation of the trust, with the exception of those
concerning real property,97 may be oral98 seemingly represents an ex-
ception to the requirement of the functional formalities and undercuts
the evidentiary purpose they serve. That, however, ignores the reality
of the creation of the oral trust. In order to create the trust orally, the
settlor must evince intent by knowing which words must be used in
94. At common law, the trust had to have a res—an asset or something of value to be
held by the trustee pursuant to the terms of the trust. In other words, the trust
could not be unfunded and could not contain an interest not yet in existence like a
contingent remainder. That requirement is eliminated if a state has enacted the
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act (1991) (UTATA) that allows such
an unfunded trust to be created. See UNIF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRUSTS
ACT § 1. However, even in states that embraced UTATA, the settlor must identify
the contingent or future interest that will become the res of the trust.
95. These requirements for the creation and existence of an irrevocable trust are
well-known and established. The goal of this Article is not to provide a primer on
trusts for the uninformed. The assumption herein is that those with the interest
to peruse this Article also possess some elemental or basic knowledge of the nuts
and bolts of trusts and estates.
96. This avoids a best evidence problem that occurs when a matter is litigated follow-
ing the death of the putative donor who, of course, cannot testify.
97. “While it is possible in most states to have personal property trusts created
orally, most important trusts of realty or personalty are created by the use of one
or more writings. Such a document is called the ‘trust instrument’ . . . [the usual]
effect of which is to provide the terms of the trust and to transfer an equitable
property interest in the described property to one or more beneficiaries. It also, in
the case of trusts created by transfer, evidences the passing of title to the trus-
tee.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 cmt. a (2003) (citing GEORGE T. BO-
GERT, TRUSTS § 23 (6th ed. 1987)).
98. “Standing alone, the law of trusts does not require a writing to create a valid
trust.” SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 29, at 403 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 20 (2003)).
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order to create the trust and must identify the trustee, the beneficiary,
and the res.99 Most importantly, there must be independent corrobo-
ration of all of these facts by a third party. That corroboration, which
normally occurs following the settlor’s death, provides the evidentiary
proof that suffices to establish the cautionary and ritualistic functions
normally met in a written irrevocable trust.100
Moreover, the formalities associated with the execution of one’s
will—the requirement that it be signed by the testator in the presence
of two witnesses in the case of non-holographic wills,101 or the require-
ment that a holographic will be entirely in the handwriting of the tes-
tator102—also complies with the ritualistic, cautionary, and
evidentiary functions performed by delivery of the gift. For the sake of
brevity, focusing only on the evidentiary function, both non-ho-
lographic and holographic wills provide ample evidentiary proof to al-
low a court to correctly discern and give effect to the testator’s intent.
A. Reliance Cases
The one type of transaction that is given effect—apparently with-
out functional formalities—are promises that induce reliance on the
part of the promisee. Only a special type of reliance case fits within
this analysis and supports the theory that certain irrevocable gift
promises are enforceable when a court believes it has sufficient evi-
dence to validate the donative promise at low administrative and error
costs.
There are three types of promises that courts enforce pursuant to
the doctrine of promissory estoppel and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 90.103 Promises made in a business setting, which this Ar-
ticle characterizes as precontractual, sometimes result in courts em-
ploying the promissory estoppel doctrine. These cases fill the gap
created by American courts’ failure to embrace the doctrine of culpa en
contrahendo, which in most European jurisdictions requires negotiat-
ing parties to act in good faith towards one another.104 These are true
reliance cases that should be governed by the law of contracts and are
appropriately remedied by the doctrine of promissory estoppel because
there is a promise, reasonable reliance, and subsequent injury.
99. Id.
100. See In re Estate of Fournier, 902 A.2d 852 (Me. 2006).
101. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010).
102. In the score of states that allow holographic wills, those wills were valid only if
they were entirely in the handwriting of the testator. That requirement has been
abolished in most states and supplanted with the requirement that only the ma-
terial provisions must be in the testator’s handwriting. See SITKOFF &
DUKEMINIER, supra note 29, at 198.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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As these cases are precontractual, they are necessarily treated as
reliance cases per the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 because
of the lack of culpa en contrahendo in American jurisprudence. They
are appropriately considered within the province of contract law and
are remediable given the harm that is created by reasonable reliance
on promises. A failure to provide a remedy in these cases results in the
creation of irremediable wrongs that could have the effect of chilling
or deterring future business relationships. The correct question to ad-
dress is: Which precontractual relations provide a remedy and which
do not?105 In other words, where must we draw the line between cases
for which a remedy is provided and those for which it is not? Further-
more, do these cases represent a de facto embrace and validation of
the doctrine of culpa en contrahendo in American law?106
The second type of reliance promises for which a remedy is sup-
plied are promises that are conscionable.107 Although much scholar-
ship has focused on the doctrine of unconscionability, little attention
has been given to its mirror image: cases in which courts use reliance
to produce an effective remedy based on equity and fairness. These
cases do not fit neatly within a type or arise from a common set of
facts or within a defined context. Adjudication of these atypical reli-
ance cases has migrated into the rather flexible, catch-all category of
reliance per the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90.
This Article advances that the public policy cases remedied
through application of § 90 of the Restatement fall within the milieu
of conscionable cases. Public policy cases are properly characterized as
common law equity cases in which the aggrieved party is appealing to
the court’s equitable powers to provide a remedy consistent with the
court’s conceptions of equity and fairness, despite the lack of promise
or reliance by the aggrieved party. In these cases, the modern court is
called upon to reprise its historical role as Chancellor of the Court ex-
ercising equitable powers. Courts here act creatively to fashion a rem-
edy for a wrong for which there is no other appropriate, pleadable
cause of action and for which there are no facts indicating contempla-
tion of a contract. As such, express equitable doctrines are better
suited for resolving public policy cases. Again, this is best described by
105. My preliminary answer is that what is reasonable reliance given the context of
the relationship between the parties delimits what is actionable and remediable
and what is not. Culpa en contrahendo, on the other hand, attaches to any negoti-
ation that is entered into by two opposing parties.
106. My preliminary answer to this question is negative. The contours of the doctrine
of culpa en contrahendo are much broader than the use of reliance per RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See Johnson, supra note
8, at 607–09. The doctrine of reasonable reliance per the use of § 90 limits the
reliance doctrine to egregious cases of promissory fraud. For further discussion of
promissory fraud, see supra note 49, 111–13 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
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use of a conscionable equitable doctrine that is the antithesis of the
unconscionability doctrine embraced by the Uniform Commercial
Code.108
Different legal norms and doctrines validate the enforceability of
both donative and public policy cases. However, those norms and doc-
trines are not contractual, therefore not requiring consideration, and
are not based on reliance necessary to support a claim of promissory
estoppel. Even so, certain unique relationships give rise to duties cre-
ated by public policy that can be breached and, therefore, support the
use of promissory estoppel to provide a remedy to the aggrieved
party.109
The third category of cases that are enforced pursuant to the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel are “failed gift” or donative cases in which
the donor’s intent to make the gift is clear, but the delivery element is
lacking. The donative intent cases are explicable given the clear intent
of the putative donor and the concomitant fact that the donor’s un-
timely death occurs before delivery can take place. What is unclear,
however, is why these failed gift cases are covered by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 90 instead of being addressed and decided by
property law principles. The development of English common law
causes of action and the laxity of pleading requirements in contract
law created the loophole that resulted in donative intent being rele-
gated to § 90.110
Importantly, all three categories of reliance cases involve a certain
level of evidentiary proof that satisfies the functional formalities. Most
importantly, evidentiary and corroborative needs are easily met in the
three types of reliance cases addressed above.111 Of course, the easiest
cases to explain are donative promissory estoppel cases where a gift
fails for lack of delivery due to the untimely death of the putative do-
nor. In these cases, intent is clearly proven by two distinct and inde-
pendent variables.
First and most obviously, because the putative donor is dead, a
third party must corroborate the donor’s intent. That evidence must
conclusively establish the donor’s intent to make a gift in order to
avoid the property passing pursuant to the intestacy scheme (if the
putative donor dies without a will) or pursuant to the putative donor’s
will (usually in the residuary clause).
108. For further discussion, see supra notes 29, 55, 94, 98–100 and accompanying text.
109. These cases are harder to characterize as appropriate for the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel but I contend that they are explicable given the relationship of the
parties and the harms occasioned thereby. See supra notes 58–60 and accompa-
nying text.
110. See supra notes 29, 55.
111. See supra notes 37–38, 109–11 and accompanying text.
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The second and somewhat counterfactual variable is the untimely
death of the putative donor before delivery of the donative asset. If the
putative donor anticipated her demise, the natural question raised
would be why the donor did not effectuate delivery prior to the antici-
pated death in order to make an inter vivos transfer, or if that was
unfeasible, memorialize her intent in a valid will to make a testamen-
tary transfer. The channeling and ritualistic variables are less impor-
tant in this context because the proof of intent coupled with the
putative donor’s untimely demise provides sufficient and stable proof
that the putative donor intended to comply with the rituals associated
with the requisite formalities. Unfortunately, the untimely demise of
the putative donor precludes participation in the ritual.
Also, relatively easy to explain as enforceable promises based on
the formalities are the culpa en contrahendo cases. In these near deal
cases, two important factors coincide to produce an enforceable prom-
ise—a promise that satisfies the functional requirements. First, there
is sufficient documentation of the parties’ putative agreement. In
these cases, all the details of the deal are reached, yet one of the par-
ties chooses for opportunistic reasons not to act as promised. Hence,
the evidence of the details of the deal sought to be enforced and the
ostensible agreement of both parties to that deal are available.
Second, and perhaps just as importantly, the conscience of the
judge in equity is engaged to enforce the agreement. Consequently,
the party seeking to enforce the agreement must prove to the satisfac-
tion of the arbiter that the agreement is fair and equitable given the
circumstances and the relationship of the parties. Thus, when evi-
dence and fairness coincide to require the arbiter to find an enforcea-
ble agreement, there is little question regarding the costs of either or
both the adjudication of the dispute or any error costs associated with
the adjudication.
Again, the channeling and ritualistic functions are less important
in this context given the relationship between the parties. The parties
have already come to a preliminary agreement that they have suffi-
ciently memorialized in all-but-final form. Indeed, they have chan-
neled their behavior to conform with the norms required by the
context provided. What is lacking in this context is the one final act, or
“finality.” For whatever reason, one party acts opportunistically and
chooses not to take the final step that precludes finality, but all other
parts of the ritual have been completed.
The hardest cases to explain as producing functional formalities
remain the public policy cases—that odd lot of cases that cannot be
cabined or classified as a type. In these sui generis cases, there are no
central or unifying factors. However, in a perverse way, they provide
proof that the functional role played by the formalities in the irrevoca-
ble gift cases are the means to an end and not the end itself. As such,
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they support the view that the use of the seal should be resurrected
and expanded to allow a party to achieve the end of enforceability if so
desired.
In other words, when the putative donor complies with the func-
tional formalities necessary to complete an irrevocable gift promise
and to effectuate a sealed contract, the putative donor is signaling her
intent to be bound to the court or trier of fact—to be bound to the end
of completing the promise in the irrevocable gift promise or in the
sealed contract. The formalities serve the function of proving the certi-
tude of the donor’s intent in cases in which the promisor is often dead
and, hence, unavailable to testify.112
In the idiosyncratic or public policy reliance cases, the court is con-
vinced that the end of doing justice or performing equity must be
deployed to rectify inequitable behavior. The end in these factually
unique cases is to achieve equity or justice and promote conscion-
ability or fairness.113 Moreover, this behavior is odious from a societal
perspective and should be penalized and dissuaded in the future.
Thus, just like courts use the functional formalities to channel behav-
ior to achieve a desirable outcome, the public policy reliance cases also
have a channeling function, although it is the obverse of the channel-
ing function associated with the functional formalities. In this area,
the courts employing their broad equitable powers in conjunction with
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 channel inappropriate so-
cietal behavior by punishing same. This inhibits odious societal behav-
ior in the same way that criminal punishment deters future criminal
behavior.114
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF CONSIDERATION AND THE
HISTORY OF THE SEAL
Contracts under seal predated the development of the doctrine of
consideration by centuries, from the late middle ages until recently
the seal was essentially supplanted by the doctrine of considera-
tion.115 Seals were deemed to validate a transfer even without consid-
eration because of the formalities associated with the execution of the
sealed writing. The formalities associated with the execution of a
sealed instrument satisfied the evidentiary function, providing relia-
ble evidence that a transaction was intended and actually took
place.116 Similarly, the sealing of wax on the parchment paper suf-
112. See supra notes 24, 34–41 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 118–119, 122 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 259 (1972).
115. PERILLO, supra note 5, at § 7.1.
116. Id.
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ficed to satisfy the ritualistic and cautionary function by providing a
secure and stable ritual to produce an enforceable agreement.
Finally, sealing satisfies the requirement of channeling by provid-
ing a stable and secure method of ensuring that if a seal is properly
used, then a court will validate the outcome later. In other words, or-
dinary citizens know that if they seal a document properly, that docu-
ment will later be validated as an enforceable agreement.117
Consequently, the act of sealing serves the same functional formal-
ities that are present with respect to the other irrevocable promises
that are enforced without consideration: inter vivos trusts, wills, and
promises that are relied on pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 90.
As a substitute for the functional formalities provided by the seal,
it stands to reason that the doctrine of consideration must satisfy
those same functional formalities to serve as a viable substitute.
Hence, it is to the rise and fall of consideration, focusing on the func-
tional formalities, that this Article now turns to establish the predi-
cate for the resurrection and expansion of the seal.
What, then, is the normative basis for the requirement of consider-
ation in enforceable contracts and does that normative reason remain
viable? The search for a normative basis for consideration is not a
novel undertaking. Consideration has been required to enforce volun-
tary agreements since well before the promulgation of the first Re-
statement of Contracts in 1931,118 and an examination of the
normative basis of consideration has been fair game for contract schol-
ars. The four primary normative theories supporting the use and func-
tion of consideration to find enforceable contracts and will then
analyze the same to determine if they support the continued use of the
doctrine of consideration to determine the enforceability of contracts.
The four normative theories can roughly and rather broadly be char-
117. Id.
118. With respect to the operation and use of seals to establish enforceable agree-
ments at common law, consideration was required at common law when seals
were used for informal agreements not requiring a seal in order to be made en-
forceable. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
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acterized as: (1) functional/formal;119 (2) realist;120 (3) moral;121 and
(4) efficiency (law and economics).122
119. Any search for a normative basis for consideration must begin with Lon Fuller’s
classic article, Consideration and Form. Lon Fullerton, Consideration and Form,
41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). Professor Fuller convincingly demonstrates that
the role of consideration in contractual agreements is both formal and functional.
Id. Indeed, Professor Fuller’s primary hypothesis is that consideration has both
formal and substantive components and he sets as his task disentangling the
two. Id. at 799. Consideration, he contends, performs primarily three functions:
evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling. Id. at 800–01. These three definitive
functions are well known to contract scholars (and, as we see, property and trust
and estate scholars) and do not require much explication.
120. The second normative base alleged for consideration is that theorized by the real-
ists. Briefly, realists believe that consideration is simply a tautological device
used by the courts to determine which contracts should be enforced. Professor
Patrick Atiyah is a leading proponent of the realist approach and contends that
consideration simply means that there is a valid societal reason like good faith,
duress, reliance or the enforcement of a moral obligation, to enforce the contract.
See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). See
also Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (addressing consideration in the
form of the enforcement of a moral obligation). Given the realist account, it
makes sense that the doctrine of consideration is tautological because it means
that courts manipulate the rule or doctrine to find consideration when there are
good reasons to enforce the agreement and do not find consideration in similar
situations when there are exogenous reasons not to enforce the agreement.
121. The third normative basis alleged for consideration is premised on the contract as
a promise. It focuses on the moral obligation of the promisor to do as promised.
The leading proponent of this theory is Professor Charles Fried. According to Pro-
fessor Fried, individuals have autonomy to impose obligations on themselves by
promising to do so. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CON-
TRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 (2d ed. 2015). These promises morally obligate them to
perform based on theories of individual autonomy and trust. Id. at 14–15. Profes-
sor Fried produces an elegant theory in which only certain promises (knowing
and fair promises, for example) should be enforced. Id. at 5, 49. He dismisses the
doctrine of consideration as a requirement for enforceable contracts because it is
alleged to be too indeterminate. Instead, he argues for the development of an
alternative theory that focuses on which promises should be enforceable based on
their fairness. Id. at 4, 49–52.
122. Certain law and economic theorists, like Professors Robert Cooter and Thomas
Ulen, criticize the doctrine of consideration encapsulated within the bargain the-
ory of contracts because it does not capture and enforce certain unilateral
promises that both the promisor and promisee want enforced, and the enforce-
ment of which makes both parties better off (a pareto superior state of affairs).
ROBERT B. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 281–82 (6th ed. 2014).
Instead they argue that a contract should be enforceable when both the promisor
and promisee want it to be enforceable. Id. This is alleged to be more efficient and
societally productive. Id. Consequently, even though the vast majority of courts
continue to follow the view that consideration is produced via this process in
which promises are bargained-for and exchanged, modern contract theory has
moved beyond this rather simplistic, circular, and tautological test to advance the
view that contracts should be enforceable if the parties intend them to be enforce-
able. The weakness of this approach is determining, of course, whether or when
the parties truly intend that the promise be enforceable. A full endorsement of
this latter theory produces the result that any promise, including perhaps a gra-
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In an earlier article,123 I establish a typology of transfers that
highlights the legal requirements for five types of distinct transfers of
property or assets: (1) contracts or agreements supported or proven by
consideration; (2) sealed agreements; (3) irrevocable inter vivos
promises (trusts);124 (4) testamentary transfers (wills); and (5) reli-
ance promises that are enforceable pursuant to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 90.125 Lawyers and academics regard these
transfers as so legally separable that they are taught in three differ-
ent courses in the normal law school curriculum: Contracts (considera-
tion and non-consideration based promises or agreements and reliance
based promises), Property (inter vivos irrevocable gifts), and Trusts
and Estates (testamentary transfers or gifts).
The different legal requirements necessary to validate each trans-
fer, however, mask a similar functional role embedded in each trans-
action. Consequently, what unifies these five types of transfers is that
each supply the courts with agreements that can be enforced with low
error and adjudicative costs.126
As a result, the earlier article compared valid and enforceable non-
consideration transfers that satisfy certain functional requirements
(irrevocable gift transfers and testamentary bequests hereafter collec-
tively sometimes referred to as donative transfers) with valid and en-
forceable non-consideration transfers that do not satisfy those same
certain functional requirements (reliance-based transfers enforced by
use of the promissory estoppel doctrine). Contract law discerns the
normative base that unifies these two disparate transactions (dona-
tive transfers and reliance-based transfers).
Gifts and testamentary transfers have a common element with
promises that create reliance even though these transactions are not
tuitous uncompleted promise, becomes enforceable as long as the parties’ intent
is sufficiently proven.
123. See Johnson, supra note 8.
124. Although there are two types of valid gift transfers—inter vivos and causa mortis
(i.e., made in contemplation of impending death)—the distinction between the
two is largely disappearing and, for the purposes of this Article, makes little if
any difference. Hence, I choose instead to focus on the more common inter vivos
gift and ignore for the sake of my argument gifts causa mortis.
125. Testamentary transfers are those that take place pursuant to a validly executed
will. Although these transfers relate back to the instant of the testator’s death,
the actual or physical transfer is accomplished through the probate process pur-
suant to which the will is validated and the testator’s assets are distributed. For
a discussion of testamentary transfers, see supra notes 84–89 and accompanying
text.
126. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litiga-
tion, 20 NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 1, 6–7 (2013). For detailed tables on the adjudica-
tive costs of real property disputes and contract disputes, see Caseload
Highlights: Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT,
www.ncsc.org/CLCM [https://perma.unl.edu/5545-ZA8Q] (last visited Feb. 24,
2020).
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supported by consideration in its classical bargain theory form. Each
transaction allows the court to supply a remedy consistent with two
related requirements: low administrative costs and minimized error
costs associated with adjudication. This is why irrevocable gift trans-
fers (i.e., completed gifts),127 testamentary transfers, and reliance-
based promises unsupported by consideration are deemed enforceable
and validated judicially.
The goal herein is not to prove that certain normative theories are
wrongheaded, nor is it to provide a comparative analysis of the four
normative theories addressed above. Rather, the goal is to assess and
describe the best normative theory to support the doctrine and use of
consideration in contract law when it is acknowledged that considera-
tion is not required for other enforceable agreements such as gifts and
testamentary transfers. In other words, can this approach find reveal
a normative theory that can explain legally enforceable promises in
contract law, as well as legally enforceable inter vivos gifts and testa-
mentary transfers? Given that the test to find consideration has not
remained static over time, the best theoretical normative basis for
consideration is indeed the functional or formal basis for consideration
fully addressed by Professor Fuller.
The demise of the use of the seal, for good and valid reasons,
should not obscure the purpose served by its use.128 The rise of the use
of consideration as the vehicle by which contracts or promises are
deemed enforceable also should not obscure the functional role of the
seal. Rather it should lead to inquiry of whether that functional role
has been met via the requirement of consideration. Thus, this Article
turns to the functional roles sealing initially served with a focus on
why agreements unsupported by consideration, either inter vivos (via
gift) or testamentary (via will), are deemed valid. The key to the valid-
127. Uncompleted gifts are gratuitous promises and are deemed unenforceable. See
supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. A completed gift is delivered and ac-
cepted by the donee and the transfer is accompanied with donative intent, which
supplies the evidentiary basis for validating the gift and insures that improvident
transfers do not take place. Completed gifts should be contrasted with uncom-
pleted gifts in which the ritualistic, corroborative, and evidentiary functions are
not complied with and the gift is deemed unenforceable.
128. The demise of the seal was due to several factors, but mainly because it was too
restrictive given the growth of commercial industry and the need for a less for-
malistic manner of making enforceable promises. JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTAND-
ING CONTRACTS § 3.02 (2d ed.). In addition, the formalism associated with the seal
eventually gave way to very informal methods of sealing. For example, one could
seal by placing the initials “L.S.” on a document so that sealing no longer satis-
fied the cautionary, evidentiary, channeling, and ritualistic functional require-
ments that would later allow a court to easily determine which agreements
should be deemed enforceable with little if any error costs. See Pitts v. Pitchard,
201 So. 2d 563 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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ity and use of consideration in contract law can only be ascertained by
examining valid agreements or transfers that are made without it.
More importantly, consideration in modern contracts serves the
same role that the seal served in England in the Middle Ages and to-
day in jurisdictions that still validate its use. The Restatement re-
quires consideration and courts find agreements enforceable with it
because consideration supplies the evidentiary, cautionary, channel-
ing, and ritualistic functions at the time of contracting and evidence of
the agreement (including establishing the remedial boundaries for en-
forcement of the right established by the contract) ex post at the time
of adjudication.
The contract under seal provided the adjudicative body with ex-
tremely reliable evidence of the agreement and its terms with the for-
malities attendant at the time of execution (ex ante) and the
information conveyed at the time of adjudication (ex post). This al-
lowed the adjudicative body to enforce the agreement with little if any
error costs and to do so by reviewing one document (i.e., at low admin-
istrative cost). Although the reasons for the demise of the seal are be-
yond the purview of this Article,129 no one claims or has demonstrated
that the seal raised difficult issues of interpretation or enforceability.
To the contrary, the contract under seal represented an effective and
efficient vehicle for a party to signal that she was entering into an
agreement that should be enforced against the sealing party notwith-
standing any subsequent objection.
Notably, the doctrine of consideration was used as a vehicle to reg-
ulate and control informal unsealed promises during the time of the
seal’s prominence and use in the Middle Ages.130 Thus, consideration
originated as a doctrine to serve the same function as the seal when
individuals either lacked a seal or the transaction was not important
enough to use a seal. Key to this Article’s thesis is the substitution
role consideration originally played, which if used as a substitute for a
seal, should suffice to serve the same role and function.
To summarize, the initial role consideration provided was purely
formal and quite functional in the guise of a seal. As use of the seal
waned, the need for some method to validate enforceable agreements
without seals still remained. Enter the doctrine of consideration,
which was the informal stepchild of the seal when the seal reigned
supreme. Eventually the doctrine of consideration evolved into an al-
129. For a discussion of what caused the demise of the seal, see Frederick E. Crane,
The Magic of Private Seal, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1915). However, the seal does
remain valid in a few jurisdictions: Delaware and Wisconsin most prominently.
See PERILLO, supra note 5 at § 7.9. A contract under seal is also recognized by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 95–96 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
130. JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 196 (10th ed. 2013).
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most tautological test131 that now requires the identification of a bar-
gain and the conferral of a benefit and/or the creation of a legal
detriment. The focus on the bargain, and relatedly, the benefit/detri-
ment created thereby, has largely obscured the functional and formal
role originally supplied by the seal. This Article is not the first to note
this phenomenon, nor will it be the last to base a normative theory
of consideration on the form and functions so provided. Indeed, a
healthy debate has emerged regarding the normative base for
consideration.132
That raises another mystery: however one grounds the normative
basis for consideration and regardless of the historical evolution of the
doctrine of consideration, so-called gratuitous promises between par-
ties in a preexisting relationship are not enforceable.133 Courts fixate
on the lack of consideration; there is no item or thing transferred to
show consideration under the common law formalistic view, no pro-
cess pursuant to which bargained-for promises are exchanged under
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts view, and no mutual intent to
be bound per the academics’ theory of consideration. Thus, courts find
mere donative promises gratuitous and unenforceable. Those who con-
tend that contracts or agreements should be enforceable if the parties
so intend come to the same conclusion that gratuitous promises are
unenforceable per se, albeit for different reasons.134
Thus, what begins as a puzzle ends in unanimity. Whether one un-
derstands the need for consideration, whether one applies one require-
ment of the rule for consideration or the other, or whether one focuses
on the parties’ intent, there is a whole class of promises that are unen-
131. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
133. To explain:
The starting point is that donative promises generally are not enforced.
This is a tenable position. In addition to difficulties of proof, the injury in
this type of case is relatively slight; there are no significant costs on the
part of the promisee and no enrichment on the part of the promisor at
the expense of the promisee. Furthermore, a donative promise may be
made without sufficient deliberation and, even deliberated, there might
be reason not to enforce it if it was made improvidently or if the promisee
showed ingratitude.
PERILLO, supra note 5, at § 4.1 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). See Mel-
vin Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821
(1997); Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 411 (1977).
134. In brief, there are three views why gratuitous promises should not be enforced:
(1) societal resources should not be employed to enforce promises when no eco-
nomic gain is created by the transfer or transaction (the prototypical sterile
transaction of yore); (2) courts are not capable of enforcing promises made with,
say, love or affection because there is no appropriate remedy in case of breach;
and (3) somewhat counterfactually and gaining ground among academic theo-
rists, certain promises are by their very nature only valuable and valid if they are
not enforceable by the courts. See supra Part I.
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forceable. Promises can therefore be divided into those that are en-
forceable and hence non-gratuitous, and those that are not enforceable
and gratuitous. In this lexicon, the focus is on whether the promise is
subsequently legally enforceable.
On the other hand, an examination of transfers, rather than
promises, reveals that a class of gratuitous transfers based on dona-
tive promises are enforceable if certain formalities or functions are
met. None of these formalities or functions, however, are considera-
tion. A gift or donative transfer must satisfy three distinct require-
ments to become enforceable.135 First, the putative donor must have
the requisite intent to make a gift. Second, the donor must transfer
possession to satisfy the delivery requirement necessary to effectuate
a gift. Third—and often overlooked—the putative donee must accept
the gift in order for it to be valid. Once these three requirements are
met, the donor has made an irrevocable gift promise.
These three formal requirements also serve functional purposes
similar to the requirement of consideration.136 Because gifts are en-
forced once these three requirements are met, it is incorrect to state
that all gratuitous transfers are unenforceable when only those gratu-
itous promises that do not meet the three requirements are not en-
forced. When these requirements are met, a court will find a
completed and valid gift and award the donee the property that is the
subject of the gift.137
Although this is a fine distinction, courts find unenforceable un-
completed gift or gratuitous promises or acts that do not satisfy intent,
delivery, and acceptance. Hence, a promise to give a gift in the future
that lacks delivery and/or acceptance by the donee is unenforceable. If,
however, the subject of the promise is delivered (and delivery does not
have to mean present delivery of possession, but can mean present
delivery of a future interest in which possession is postponed)138 and
subsequently accepted by the donee, that transfer is just as enforcea-
ble as an agreement supported by bargained-for consideration. My
earlier article139 examined three different types of exchanges: (1) con-
tract-based exchanges with consideration, (2) gratuitous transfers
135. See infra notes 149, 161, 190 and accompanying text.
136. The functional purposes are: ritualistic, evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling.
See Phillip Mechem, Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Com-
mercial Instruments, 22 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348–49 (1926); supra note 99–108 and
accompanying text.
137. See Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986) (awarding donee pos-
session of Gustav Klimt painting in possession of stepmother when donee estab-
lished delivery, intent, and acceptance of the painting as a twenty-first birthday
present).
138. See id. at 194.
139. See Johnson, supra note 8.
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that are enforced even given the absence of consideration,140 and
(3) gratuitous promises that are not supported by consideration and
are largely unenforced.
Consequently, what has heretofore been ignored in the academic
literature discussing the distinction between contracts that are en-
forceable because of consideration and irrevocable gift promises are
functional formalities, which both transactions have in common. The
resurrection and use of the seal in contract transactions will serve
those same functional formalities and should be embraced by parties,
scholars, and courts.
In Contracts and the Requirement of Consideration: Positing a Uni-
fied Normative Theory of Contracts, Inter Vivos and Testamentary Gift
Transfers,141 I presented my thesis that conveyances, that is con-
tracts, inter vivos, and testamentary gifts, although arising in differ-
ent silos of the law, are connected and related by the functional
formalities. The functional formalities present in each conveyance al-
low courts to later adjudicate their validity at low error and adminis-
trative costs. The present-day functional formalities are substitutes
for the functional formality originally produced by using the seal.
In order to validate the thesis that today’s functional formalities
and their role in validating conveyancing are historical successors to
the role played by the seal, the earlier article exhaustively detailed the
rise and fall of the use of the seal in the contracts silo. That is summa-
rized herein.
First, to give context to the current lack of the seal’s use, I examine
the requirements for a valid sealed contract and a briefly review the
rise and fall of the seal. In order to have a valid sealed contract, a deed
(meaning a formal writing and not a conveyance of real property)
must be produced in writing, the writing must contain a promise
which is sufficiently definite, and the promisor and the promisee must
be named. For most of the time that seals were used, seals were addi-
tionally required to consist of wax affixed to the paper or writing upon
which the terms of the instrument were written.142
A few requirements must be met in addition to these formalities.
First, the party executing the sealed instrument must intend it to be a
sealed instrument.143 Essentially, if there is fraud in execution—for
example, if the executing party believed she was sealing another docu-
ment—that would negate the intent required to have a sealed instru-
ment. This was an important requirement because many of the
140. These gratuitous and enforceable transfers can be inter vivos, that is gift, or tes-
tamentary via wills.
141. Johnson, supra note 8.
142. PERILLO, supra note 5, at § 7.3.
143. Id. at § 7.5.
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parties sealing at that time were illiterate. Thus, one who could not
read could easily be duped to execute a seal on the wrong document.
Second, the sealed instrument must be delivered in order to attain
validity.144 There is debate over a potential third requirement, which
is beyond the scope of this Article, but some have claimed that the
party receiving the sealed instrument must accept it.145 Acceptance
may not have been viewed as a formal requirement to the creation of
an enforceable sealed document because it may have been difficult, if
not impossible, for the common law at that time to recognize “negative
property,” or property rights that could impose costs on the donee
worth more than the conveyed property. Hence, acceptance may have
been assumed as a given (why would anyone refuse positive value
property?) rather than as a requirement.
However, given that the requirements for the validity of a gift are
intent, delivery, and acceptance, it makes perfect sense that in an-
other transaction lacking consideration (which presupposes mutual
assent of the parties), the same trilogy of requirements should apply.
Furthermore, the fact that the same functional formalities are re-
quired for a sealed document and a valid gift is not coincidental. The
fact that the same requirements must be met for donative as well as
non-donative transactions is illustrative of the normative basis for the
requirements. These functional formalities serve a number of pur-
poses. Primarily, however, they serve evidentiary, cautionary, and
channeling functions.146
Over time the requirements of a waxed seal waned and, because
ordinary citizens did not have access to a signet ring to effectuate a
seal, the law began to accept substitutes for a seal: the words “seal” or
the letters “L.S.” (locus sigilli in Latin, meaning literally the place of
the seal) were sufficient to establish a sealed document.147 Indeed, the
laxity that led to the replacement of the wax seal with these lesser
requirements contributed to the demise of the seal in many jurisdic-
tions. The legal community alleged that the non-legal community
failed to respect the seal, making sealed and non-sealed documents
largely indistinguishable.148
Consequently, the use and legal effect of the seal has been mini-
mized, if not abolished, in many jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have
144. Id.
145. Id. at § 7.6.
146. For further discussion of these formalities and how they operate in contract law,
see infra notes 115–26 and accompanying text.
147. PERILLO, supra note 5, at § 7.3.
148. This collapse of the use of the seal due to its ultimate incoherence is similar to the
collapse of the doctrine of consideration due to its incoherence. The reason this
Article contends that the seal should be revived today is that the population is
literate and that the novelty of the seal will cause it to be used only when in-
tended. Hence, the seal will not fall into the same incoherence today.
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concluded that the disadvantage of the conflation of sealed and non-
sealed documents by the populace outweighed the seal’s advantages of
ease and certainty. The informality with which a document may be
sealed created a process of sealing that did not impress upon parties
the seriousness of the formal conduct.149 The seal is now viewed
largely as an historical anachronism with little or no relevance in to-
day’s modern, fast-paced, transactional world. Today, the fact that a
sealed contract is validated in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts150 seems to have had no positive impact on the use of the seal in
transactions. As a result, the seal has largely been relegated to the
historical dustbin as an antiquated formalistic transaction that has no
place in modern contractual relationships.
However, in an age in which standard form contracts are the norm,
using a seal to formalize a contract will be the exception and not the
rule. It will impart to the sealing parties that they are engaged in an
atypical transaction. Standard form contracts are drafted by busi-
nesses and other commercial enterprises that engage in multiple
transactions over a period of time. Instead of negotiating with each
new party, businesses reduce individual transaction costs by offering
the other party (normally the consumer) a contract on a take it or
leave it basis. The cost of drafting the standard form contract is thus
spread over many transactions and passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices. This is the positive aspect of standard form
contracts.151
The many negative aspects associated with the use of standard
form contracts are relevant to the thesis of this Article. First, standard
form contracts contain lengthy paragraphs of densely drafted terms
that may allocate legal rights (i.e., waivers and admissions) that only
a lawyer or one well-versed in contract law can understand.152 Sec-
ond, as the standard form contract is drafted typically by businesses
and used repeatedly in their dealings with consumers, these contracts
are drafted to favor and reward the draftsmen’s employer—the
businesses.153
What is even more insidious is that because contracts are lengthy,
dense, and ubiquitous, in most transactions—including transactions
as important as financing the purchase of a house with a mortgage
149. PERILLO, supra note 5, at § 7.1. The demise of the use of the seal has not gone
unnoticed or without criticism. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 100 (7th ed. 2007) (“[I]t’s disappearance is a puzzle.”).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 95 et. seq. (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
151. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY REFORMA-
TION OF CONTRACT LAW 30 (1996).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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that is executed on as a standard form contract154—the consumers
entering into these contracts do not read them. Even if they do read
them, they do not understand them.155 Although Henry Maine
presented a thesis that as societies evolve and modernize contract and
other rights that were once grounded on one’s status rights (i.e., as a
peon, serf, nobleman, or lord) will eventually evolve and be based on
individual rights or individually negotiated rights, one can make the
argument that the evolution did not stop there. Instead individual
rights have been supplanted by the “status right” of being a “con-
sumer” and a “consumer” does not read or understand the standard
form contract that is almost universally used in all consumer transac-
tions.156 Given the rise and almost universal use of standard form
contracts, contract rights have evolved from status to contract (i.e.,
individual rights) back to status rights (i.e., consumer versus commer-
cial business entity).157
What that means for the thesis of this Article is that a sealed con-
tract, because it is not a standard form contract, represents a signifi-
cant outlier in the world of contracting. A sealed contract is anomalous
in that it is not used repeatedly by businesses or consumers in their
transactions,158 nor is it a complex customized contract drafted by two
lawyers representing the parties to the contract.159 A sealed contract
would occupy a niche of contracting that would allow a party to bind
his or her promise in a gratuitous or non-gratuitous transaction sim-
ply because that party intends to be bound.160 In other words, the act
of sealing would become the exception in contracts, not the norm, and
would not run the risk of being used indeterminately or unknowingly.
154. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Preventing a Return Engagement: Eliminating the
Mortgage Purchasers’ Status as a Holder-in-Due-Course: Properly Aligning Incen-
tives Among the Parties, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 529, 553 (2010).
155. Id.
156. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100–01 (2007).
157. SLAWSON, supra note 151, at 135.
158. Admittedly, nothing would preclude businesses from drafting standard form con-
tracts with a requirement that they be sealed by the consumer or the party who
did not draft it. But why would they bother? The seal is not a standard form
contract requirement and through the talents of the scrivener who drafted the
standard form contracts, there should be no question regarding the existence of
consideration or the enforceability of that standard form contract. Adding sealing
to such a contract would simply add another cost with no benefit but with a po-
tential harm that the standard form contract was not properly sealed.
159. In other words, it is not a relational contract. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090–91 (1981) (defining
relational contracts).
160. This comports with current law and economic theories that parties should be le-
gally bound to an enforceable promise if that is their wish and there are no exoge-
nous reasons (i.e., duress or unconscionability) not to respect that intent nor
indigenous reasons (i.e., lack of capacity, intoxication, minority) not to respect
those wishes. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the reasons for the demise of the seal at common law would not
exist is the use of the seal is resurrected.
V. CONCLUSION
The oft-stated shibboleth that promises unsupported by considera-
tion are unenforceable is wrong, as is the related claim that gift
promises are mere nudum pactums and are likewise unenforceable.
Instead, certain promises and acts that are executed with certain for-
malities are enforceable. Although they are distinct and varied, they
satisfy certain functional formalities: ritualistic, channeling, and,
most importantly, evidentiary and corroborative. The latter two for-
malities allow courts to adjudicate disputes efficiently and with low
error costs.
Although these promises are factually and legally distinct, they all
lead to the conclusion that what is important about the promise is not
so much the intent of the promisor, but the fact that the intent can
later be proven in a way that demonstrates that the promisor desired
to be bound—that the promise was not precatory in nature.
Theory and practice support the view that one should be able to
bind her future self to act as promised as long as there are no inequi-
table consequences of such a promise. Thus, the resurrection and ex-
panded use of the seal in contractual relationships is now warranted.
This resurrection and expansion is buttressed by the fact that the doc-
trine of consideration in contract law has become almost illusory in
nature. The formalities provided by the use of a seal in contractual
relations (as opposed to donative contexts) satisfies those formalities
that are necessary to find an irrevocable gift promise.
In addition, the use of the seal in donative transfers and contrac-
tual relations provides a degree of certainty to the enforceability of a
promise that may be lacking if the doctrine of consideration is the only
method used to examine it. That certainty will induce and increase
donative transfers avoiding the necessity of consulting legal counsel to
complete the formalities required for an inter vivos trust (the other
method of making an irrevocable inter vivos transfer). It will also sim-
plify arms-length bargaining or contracting without requiring some-
thing so cumbersome as consideration. In both donative and arms-
length conveyances, the use of the seal will reduce adjudicative and
error costs regarding the enforcement of both donative and non-gratu-
itous agreements.
As a result, sealed contracts must be added to those irrevocable gift
promises that are currently enforced: to wit, promises made in inter
vivos irrevocable trusts and testamentary wills, and promises that in-
duce reliance per the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90. When
this is accomplished, the acts of contracting and accomplishing an ef-
fective and irrevocable donative transfer will be more efficient.
